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Background
In 2009 the Palestinian Government, a non-State Party, lodged a 
Declaration (the “2009 Declaration”) with the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) under Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute accepting the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction of the ICC for ‘acts committed on the territory 
of Palestine since 1 July 2002.’1 The purpose of the Declaration was 
to invite the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC to investigate 
claims of possible war crimes and crimes against humanity alleged-
ly committed by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the 2008-2009 
Operation Cast Lead, as documented by the Goldstone Report.2  
However, in April 2012 the OTP declined to accept jurisdiction. It 
justified its decision based on the fact that Palestine had, at the 
time, only the status of an ‘Observer Entity’ at the United Nations 
(UN). For the OTP, it was up to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) or 
the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) of the ICC to determine whether 
Palestine could qualify as a state for the purposes of the ICC Stat-
ute. Until such determination was made, the OTP would be unable 
to proceed.3
On the 29 November 2012, the UNGA voted overwhelmingly — 138 
in favour to 9 against (Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Marshall Is-
lands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Panama, Palau, Unit-
ed States), with 41 abstentions — to accord Palestine ‘Non-Member 
Observer State’ Status in the UN. 
The reaction to the UNGA vote in favor of the new status for Pal-
estine has been swift from various camps. The Israelis expressed 
their opposition by noting that ‘the route to peace ran through di-
rect negotiations between Jerusalem and Ramallah.’4  The emphasis 
on a political solution was also at the heart of the European Union 
delegation’s statement, which interpreted the vote as an impetus 
for moving forward with restarting the dialogue between the two 
camps. 
On 29 November 2012, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) 
voted overwhelmingly to accord Palestine 
‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in the 
UN. In the first part of this Policy Brief, the 
implications of upgrading the status of 
Palestine with regard to the possible role 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
will be assessed. In April 2012, the Office 
of the Prosecutor of the ICC declined to 
accept jurisdiction for acts committed on 
the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002, 
justifying its decision based on the fact that 
Palestine had, at the time, only the status of 
an ‘Observer Entity’ at the UN. Subsequently, 
it will be analysed if the Palestinian pursuit 
of its cause before the ICC can be considered 
as an effective lawfare strategy or rather as 
a poisoned chalice.
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The Palestinians could not agree more, but they also believe that 
the elevation of Palestine’s status at the UN would even the play-
ing field between Israel and Palestine, by granting the latter ac-
cess to the full range of protection under the international crimi-
nal law regime. This newly gained status seems to give Palestinian 
officials some of the leverage they believe they lacked in their 
negotiations with Israel, especially regarding the issue of Israeli 
settlements.
Is the UN General Assembly Vote a Real Game Changer?
But how much of a real game changer is the UNGA vote as it 
relates to the jurisdiction of the ICC? The answer is not quite 
straightforward. However, in its April 2012 decision to decline 
jurisdiction on the basis of the 2009 Declaration, the Office of 
The Prosecutor expressly relied on the practice of the Secretary 
General as treaty depositary and, in turn, on determinations by 
the ‘competent organs’ of the UN, and by the General Assembly 
in particular. Given this fact, it seems now more difficult for the 
OTP to maintain the position that it may not proceed with an 
examination of international crimes alleged to have been com-
mitted in Gaza and the West Bank.5 This is even more so in light 
of a recent statement by the new ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda. 
In September 2012, Bensouda stated that  ‘[w]hat we have also 
done is to leave the door open and to say that if this […] if Pales-
tine is able to pass over that (statehood) hurdle, of course, under 
the General Assembly, then we will revisit what the ICC can do’. 6 
If the OTP decides however to decline jurisdiction on the basis of 
the 2009 Declaration, as an alternative the Palestinian Govern-
ment could come under the jurisdiction of the ICC by ratifying 
the ICC Statute. Instruments of ratification are to be deposited 
and accepted by the Secretary-General of the UN.7  It seems likely 
that the UN Secretary-General would follow the lead of the Gen-
eral Assembly and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) in considering Palestine a state for the 
purposes of treaty ratification.  
However, even assuming that Palestine is accepted by the OTP as 
being a state for the purposes of Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute, or 
alternatively Palestine ratifies the ICC Statute, and the Palestinian 
situation thus comes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, there remain 
a number of other legal issues to be taken into consideration. 
Firstly, it is not clear if the acceptance of the 2009 Declaration or a 
Palestinian ratification could apply retroactively all the way back to 
July 2002, when the ICC Statute entered into force, and thus well 
before 29 November 2012, the date of the UNGA resolution up-
grading the status of Palestine. It is probably correct to assume that 
Palestine was already a state before the UNGA resolution. That said, 
it would not seem irrational for the Court to conclude that Palestine 
existed as a State at least prior to Operation Cast Lead in December 
2008. After all, by that time more than 125 states had recognized 
Palestine and a strong case can be made that Palestine has long 
satisfied the objective requirements for statehood provided by the 
Montevideo Convention — population, defined territory, govern-
ment, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 8
Any determination that a Palestinian declaration or ratification ap-
plies retroactively is however only the starting point. To open an in-
vestigation the OTP must also consider Article 53 of the ICC Statute. 
Under Article 53, three benchmarks are to be taken into considera-
tion before the OTP can decide to proceed with an investigation. 
To start with, the OTP is to consider whether there is a ‘reason-
able basis’ to believe a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
has been committed.9 Since the ‘reasonable basis’ standard is 
the lowest evidentiary standard in the ICC Statute, the informa-
tion available to the OTP is neither expected to be ‘comprehen-
sive’ nor ‘conclusive’ if compared to the information gathered 
during the investigation and trial phases. Since the Goldstone 
Report indicated that crimes against humanity and war crimes 
‘likely’ occurred during Operation Cast Lead, this first bench-
mark will probably not pose much of a problem.
Subsequently, the second benchmark consists of a reference to 
the principle of complementarity as enshrined in Article 17 of 
the ICC Statute.10 This requires an examination as to whether the 
relevant state(s) (in casu Israel and Palestine) is/are conducting 
or has/have conducted national proceedings in relation to the 
groups of persons and the crimes allegedly committed during 
those incidents, which together would likely form the object of 
the Court’s investigations.11 Furthermore, the proceedings must 
have been carried out genuinely12  and must have been conducted 
independently or impartially.13 At this point in time, it seems that 
the crimes committed on Palestinian territory would be admissible 
before the ICC. No investigations of Hamas rocket assaults into Is-
rael have been carried out by the Palestinian authorities. While Is-
rael has a track record of conducting at least some investigations 
into war crimes committed during Operation Cast Lead, Amnesty 
International for instance has labelled them as failing ‘to meet 
international standards of independence, impartiality, transparen-
cy, promptness and effectiveness’14, which would make potential 
cases against Israeli officials admissible before the ICC. 
Lastly, the OTP is required to take into account the gravity of the 
crime and to assess whether there are substantial reasons to be-
lieve that an investigation would serve the interests of justice.15 
While it seems undisputable that crimes committed, for instance, 
during Operation Cast Lead, are grave enough to warrant the 
opening of an investigation, the OTP might decline to open an 
investigation on the basis of the interests of justice notion. In 
2007, the OTP issued a Policy Paper on the notion of ‘interests 
of justice’. While the Paper clearly speaks in favor of investiga-
tions or prosecutions and of the exceptional nature of interests 
of justice16, it also highlights that it could take into consideration 
ongoing peace processes.17 Given the highly fraught, political 
nature of any investigation into Israeli or Palestinian crimes, the 
OTP may decline to go forward, arguing that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice. In particular, commenta-
tors have pointed out that the issue of Israeli settlements is one 
that should be decided politically, rather than by the ICC.18
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Palestine Pursuing Its Cause Before the ICC: an Effective Law-
fare Strategy or a Poisoned Chalice?
How should one assess Palestine’s pursuit of its cause before the 
ICC on the basis of the 2009 Declaration, or alternatively, in case 
the OTP declines jurisdiction on the basis of the latter Declaration, 
by ratifying the ICC Statute? Would an investigation by the ICC 
be an effective ‘lawfare’ tool that would provide the Palestinian 
Government important leverage in its negotiations with Israel, or 
would it be a poisoned chalice?
The answer is of course not clear-cut, but the Palestinians should be 
careful what they wish for. The Palestinians stand to both lose and 
win the most; with the final balance depending on what they value 
more: subjecting Israel’s settlement plans and military interventions 
in the West Bank and Gaza to greater legal scrutiny versus shielding 
domestic militant groups and leaders from the reach of the ICC.
On the one hand, it goes without saying that the decision taken 
by the Palestinian Government to pursue its cause before the ICC 
could affect Israeli actions both in terms of the settlement con-
struction in West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as its military 
incursions into the Occupied Territories (OT). In a letter addressed 
to the Secretary-General of the UN and the President of the UN 
Security Council immediately following the UN General Assembly 
vote, the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the UN reiterated the 
Palestinian delegation’s position that ‘all Israeli settlement activi-
ties are illegal, constituting grave breaches of article 49 (6) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention and thus constituting war crimes, as 
further determined in accordance with [...] article 8 (2) (b) (viii) of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Israel, the oc-
cupying Power, must be held accountable for all of the war crimes 
it is committing against the Palestinian people’.19
The letter was later approvingly cited by the most recent UN Hu-
man Rights Council (UNHRC) report of February 2013 which also 
found Israel, as an occupying power, in violation of Article 49 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention for ‘transferring parts of its civilian 
population into territory that it occupies’.20
The implication in both documents is clear: the Palestinians see 
the ICC as an instrument of compliance aimed at what they con-
sider Israel’s ongoing violations of international law. Furthermore, 
some have suggested that Palestinians stand to win from the 
Court’s involvement in the future simply by making the settlement 
issue politically toxic for Israeli politicians; not to mention the pos-
sibility that should the Court find Israeli officials criminally liable 
for their involvement in the settlement construction programme, 
the verdict would have an immediate impact on criminalizing do-
nations subsidising the settlement construction by individuals liv-
ing abroad (e.g. United States) and could help move forward the 
peace process.21  
On the other hand however, the Palestinian Government might 
want to reconsider its strategy. It has been argued, for example, 
that should the Court’s jurisdiction be extended over the situation 
in Palestine, prosecutions of Hamas’ crimes might proceed more 
easily than similar prosecutions of Israeli crimes.22 In the eyes of 
some, prosecuting Hamas’ officials for the organisation’s attacks 
on Israeli civilians might prove an easier task than holding Israeli 
officials accountable for Israel’s disproportionate military attacks 
on Palestinian civilians, the collective punishment of Palestinians, 
and the transfer of Israeli civilians into occupied territories. The 
latter crimes are fraught with ambiguity and difficult to prove.23
Furthermore, Palestine, after having lodged a Declaration under 
Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute or having ratified the ICC Statute, 
would have a duty to cooperate with investigations and implement 
arrest warrants, while Israel would not have such a legal obligation.
In addition, Palestinian civilian and military officials from across 
the political spectrum, both in Gaza and in the West Bank, could 
find themselves the target of OTP investigations and/or prosecu-
tions with the Palestinian Government unable to stop any such 
investigations and/or prosecutions. Such investigations and/or 
prosecutions would inevitably invite more instability in the Occu-
pied Territories, as Hamas and militant organisations operating in 
the territories express their disapproval of increased legal scru-
tiny. 
What is also very likely is that the Prosecutor will be sensitive to the 
need to seem impartial, which means that investigations and/or 
prosecutions against Israeli officials will inevitably be balanced by 
investigations and/or prosecutions of Palestinian officials. Here, 
the aforementioned principle of complementarity plays an impor-
tant role, making the Palestinians the more likely target of ICC 
prosecutions. Under the principle of complementarity, the Court 
must defer to national jurisdictions should the latter demonstrate 
that they are both able and willing to prosecute their citizens for 
crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. In this case, the 
balance is again tilted in favor of Israel.
Israel does have a generally well-regarded and respected judicial sys-
tem and, as already stated, has at times prosecuted its citizens for 
acts against the Palestinian population. While it is true that such pros-
ecutions have rarely resulted in guilty verdicts and are not seen as im-
partial, it would be more difficult for the OTP to find Israel’s judicial 
system unable or unwilling to prosecute. On the other hand, much 
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like in Kenya and more recently in Libya where the ICC asserted its 
authority over the objections of the national courts, it would be dif-
ficult for the Palestinians to claim that any of its citizens indicted for 
war crimes or crimes against humanity would get a hearing from an 
able or willing court, especially given the current division between 
a Fatah-led West Bank and a Hamas-led Gaza Strip. 
The end result would be that Palestinian officials both in the West 
Bank and Gaza will either find themselves in the Hague mounting 
their defense in what can be a very lengthy and financially drain-
ing process, or will be forever on the run, thus undermining the 
Court’s legitimacy in the region and the Palestinian government’s 
ability to wield the specter of the Court’s justice over the head of 
Israeli officials.
Conclusion
The UN General Assembly vote has ushered in a new era for Pal-
estine. By elevating its status from an ‘Observer Entity’ to a ‘Non-
Member Observer State’, the Palestinians can now begin to con-
template the possibilities that full statehood offers. Meanwhile, 
they must make some important choices about how they lever-
age this new status and what international instruments they avail 
themselves of to turn that hope into reality. The above discussion 
leaves no doubt that those choices will not be easy. Jurisdiction 
of the ICC on the basis of the 2009 Declaration or a Palestinian 
ratification of the ICC Statute can provide the Palestinian govern-
ment with a much-needed leverage in its negotiations with Israel. 
But doing so comes with a set of risks that the Palestinian officials 
would do well to contemplate. Regardless, by enabling the eleva-
tion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a legal argument, the UN 
General Assembly vote has already proven a game changer.
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